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Subjecthood in Pāṇini’s Grammatical Tradition1
Artemij Keidan
According to the communis opinio, there is no place for the grammatical category 
of subject in Pāṇini’s grammar of Sanskrit. This is due to the fact that, according 
to many scholars of Pāṇini, Sanskrit lacks this category in its grammar. However, 
if we take into consideration a wider view of what Pāṇini’s grammar is and what 
language it presupposes, we can conclude that speaking of subject becomes more 
sensible, especially if we take into account some features of subjecthood that so far 
have not been used in this respect. I conclude that, if not Pāṇini himself, some later 
commentators could have had a notion very similar to subject in their linguistic 
background, which induced them to interpret Pāṇini’s theories so that the idea of 
subjecthood eventually surfaced.
1. Setting the Problem
Many scholars of the Ancient Indian grammatical tradition, more specifically of 
Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī (ca. 5th cent. BC), including those who disagree on several oth-
er aspects of this field, converge in supporting the following claim:
1)
There is no notion of subject in Pāṇini’s grammar of Sanskrit.
This claim has been variously argued, in line with the gradual evolution of the 
Western theory of language and grammar in general and, especially, that of the no-
tion of “subject”. To quote just two preeminent authorities in this respect: «Ver-
nacular grammar has no term to name the subject of the sentence or grammatical 
subject» (Speijer 1886, 1, n. 1). And, almost a century later: «Pāṇini’s grammar is 
characterized by an important absence: the notion of grammatical subject is ab-
1. This paper is offered in homage to Professor Giuliano Boccali, who taught us to read Indian 
poetry, also as a linguist. I am also grateful to Luca Alfieri, Lev Blumenfeld, Elisa Freschi, Leonid 
Kulikov and Tiziana Pontillo for their valuable remarks on an early draft of this paper.
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sent» (Cardona 1974, 244).2 In the present paper, I will question the claim (1), and 
will suggest an alternative approach to subjecthood in Indo-Aryan in a broader 
sense, i.e. beyond Classical Sanskrit. Though not totally refuting the common 
opinion, I still attempt to show that there is much more to say on this topic, besides 
a mere observation that something is lacking in some description of some language. 
In my opinion, every component of (1) needs a critical revision. To begin with, 
we have to better define our understanding of the notion of subjecthood in order 
to be able to decide whether it is absent or present in Pāṇini’s theory. Next, we have 
to start distinguishing between Pāṇinian tradition as a whole – known as pāṇinīya 
– and what is effectively stated in the Aṣṭādhyāyī strictly speaking. Not only do 
post-Pāṇinian commentaries present some remarkable innovations (including, as 
we will see, a tendency towards the individuation of subjecthood), but different 
theoretical levels can be seen even within the Aṣṭādhyāyī itself. Furthermore, while 
in Vedic and Classical Sanskrit there is apparently almost no real need for postulat-
ing a privileged sentential argument similar to our subject, the situation can change 
if we take into account the so-called “grammarians’ Sanskrit”, which I interpret as 
the mother-tongue of the speakers who constituted the grammar’s core audience. 
The main source of evidence for such language would be the linguistic examples 
made by the grammarians, rather than the grammar itself.
2. What Subject?
A curious, and often silent, axiom has been traditionally assumed on subject, 
namely the idea that it is something that every language necessarily has.3 When we 
are faced with a grammatical sentence in an Indo-European (classical) language, 
we always manage to somehow find its subject, partly thanks to some — rather 
vague and informal — presuppositions we were provided with even back at prima-
ry school. As for some well-known resistant cases (i.e., languages without subject), 
linguists either consider it necessary to find it there at any cost or, at least, to pro-
vide an explanation for its absence.
It is not clear to me, though, why the notion of subject should have such logical 
priority only on the apparent ground of the Eurocentrism of Western linguistics 
(see also Dryer 1997). Indeed, typologists have long observed a number of languages 
2. The history of the investigations on this topic up to the 1950s is summed up by Al-George 
(1958). In the present paper, I will be mostly dealing with authors of the second half of the 20th cent. 
To name but a few: Rocher (1964), Cardona (1974; 1976b), Hook (1980; 1991).
3. This presupposition was not subject to any serious criticism until such recent functionalist 
frameworks as Role and Reference Grammar (see Foley‒Van Valin 1984). 
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where subject, in its “Standard Average European” flavour, seems so evanescent 
as to be considered non-existent. Schooling background provides no intuition for 
solving such cases.
Moreover, there is no commonly accepted definition of the notion of subject. 
Linguists use this term with reference to completely different phenomena, belong-
ing to different levels of linguistic – and possibly even extra-linguistic – analysis (see 
Bakker‒Siewierska 2007). Actually, new definitions have often been formulated 
with the precise intention of supporting this category in resistant languages, as if 
having a subject, however defined, was an absolute necessity.4 Clearly, without a 
common definition, any debate on subject in general, and on subject in Pāṇini’s 
grammar in particular, would be futile. Let us then start with a brief survey of the 
various definitions of subjecthood that have been proposed so far. 
Historically, and even etymologically, this notion originated in Aristotelian log-
ic: Greek ὑποκείμενον ‘the underlying’ was used in order to indicate the subject 
of a predication, i.e. the individual entity to which some property is ascribed or 
predicated. It was translated into Latin by Boethius (6th cent. AD) as subiectum 
(lit. ‘thrown under’; English subject is derived from this); it originally had some 
degree of overlap with other terms, among which we can mention substantia, lit. 
‘the standing under, the purport’, whence English substance.5 While intended to 
be used in philosophy and logic, the Aristotelian subject eventually also came to 
be interpreted as a grammatical term, for obvious reasons: in a philosophical dis-
course, the substantial element of the sentence to which a property is ascribed, 
usually does also correspond to the grammatical subject of that sentence. Today, we 
could use the term topic to refer to a similar notion, which however belongs to the 
communicative level of the sentence, rather than to the grammatical one. Another 
term that has been used and ultimately abandoned for this notion is “psychological 
subject”. In his discussion of subject in Sanskrit, Cardona (1976b) uses the phrase 
subject of predication in order to refer to this philosophical subject.
Increasingly misconceived Aristotelian ideas survived in medieval “speculative 
grammar” and Port-Royal “philosophical grammar”, and ended up with what 
has been termed the “traditional subject”, i.e. the one that was taught in grammar 
schools, at least up to the beginning of the XX cent. Here we can observe a pro-
liferation of definitions: their intuitiveness and informality concealed the fact that 
subject is not always easily detectable. Usually, a misconceived idea of topicality 
(the so-called “psychological subject”) was combined here with a morphological 
definition (through the nominative case marking and verbal agreement), alongside 
4. Note that the never-solved problem of defining reliable cross-linguistic categories does not 
affect only subject, but rather the whole discipline of linguistics, see Haspelmath (2010).
5. On the conceptual and terminological history of subject and substance refer to Alfieri (2006).
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the postulation of agentivity (the subject is that which accomplishes the action) 
and some insights into linear ordering for languages with a fixed constituent order 
(the subject usually comes first in the sentence in English). It soon became quite 
evident that these different definitions were inconsistent with each other, in the 
sense that they did not apply to the same elements and their boundaries were too 
indeterminate. In a critical revision of what he considered outdated and naïve tra-
ditional views, Otto Jespersen himself arrived at a definition which, however, is far 
from acceptable today (see Jespersen 1924, Ch. XI).
A first great innovation in this respect came out of Chomsky’s Transformation-
al Grammar, whose subsequent variants have all been consistent in excluding any 
kind of “grammatical relations”, including subject, from the basic inventory of 
concepts. TG aimed at being a purely formal theory, which, at least ideally, makes 
no use of semantic constraints in order to describe the functioning of grammar. 
Semantics is only considered an interpretation of the syntactic form. Thus, instead 
of using the term subject, Chomsky simply observes that, among the arguments of 
the predicate, there is one which, in the tree structure, is syntactically immediately 
dominated by S (Sentence, or, in later terms, is a specifier of the IP, Inflectional 
Phrase), see Farrell (2005, Ch. 5). Because it is outside the VP (Verb Phrase) the 
subject is often called the “external argument”. This term is still purely formal in 
nature, since it does not involve any semantic or pragmatic judgment. But it pre-
supposes that we are always able to construct the constituency tree on the ground 
of the combinatorial features alone (i.e. constituency tests), which suddenly be-
come less certain as soon as we go beyond English and, even worse, outside the 
“Standard Average European”. Here, Chomsky’s anti-semantic attitude becomes 
less consistent: the constituency of such languages as, for example, Chinese is often 
decided apparently on the only ground of the constituency structure of the English 
translational equivalents of the sentences under consideration. And this is clearly a 
semantic, rather than a formal, criterion.6
On the functionalist side, the seminal paper by Keenan (1976) represented a sec-
ond paradigm-changing turn in the study of subjecthood after Chomsky’s rejection 
of this category. Keenan recognises that no simple, yet universally valid, definition 
of subject is possible and suggests a different approach. He proposes quite a long 
list of features that characterise subject, and then checks all the verbal arguments 
against such features. If the evidence shows that the features converge on one and 
6. Thus, in their discussion of the controversial VP in Chinese,  Huang et alii (2009, 78) in-
clude the following admission: «That non-head components inside the VP are divided into objects 
and modifiers is long-held wisdom with its basis in intuition». The Generativist notion of “silent 
movements” is also a good illustration of this attitude: «[...] Chinese question words front to the 
beginning of the sentence as they do in English, but […] this fronting is not pronounced» (Boeckx 
2006, 44).
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only one argument of the verb in the basic sentence in a certain language, then such 
argument can be considered the subject in the language under consideration. Note 
that, if this does not happen, we have to recognise that the language has no subject 
at all, i.e. there is no privileged argument in the basic sentence here. This explains 
how the subject can be a contingent statistical category, instead of being a linguistic 
universal.
Keenan’s approach is often still considered valid today, even if with many emen-
dations and additions to the feature list upon which subjecthood is tested. In par-
ticular, in today’s variants of this method (see, for example, Van Valin‒LaPolla 1997, 
Ch. 6), it seems that Keenan’s semantic features – such as independence, indispen-
sability, autonomy, definiteness, topicality, agentivity, etc. – play a less important 
role in comparison to coding and behavioural features (such as nominative mark-
ing, triggering of verbal agreement, conjunction reduction, equi-deletion, etc.).7 A 
merit of Keenan’s approach has been to provide the grounds for a clear distinction 
between form and content in relation to the category of subject. Thus, subject cor-
responds to a set of linguistic formal features, which can vary from language to lan-
guage, but it also conveys some important semantic and pragmatic content, which, 
apparently, does not vary too much. A good summary of this content is provided 
by Bhat (1991), who states that the category of subject results from the coalescence 
of topic and agent in one and the same morphological or syntactic coding. For 
example, in English the preverbal position is reserved for topical noun phrases, but 
also marks the agent, in order to distinguish it from the patient (in case the verbal 
arguments are ambiguous in such respect). Therefore, postulating an intermediary 
category helps with the grammatical description in case «[…] the representations 
of two distinct types of sentential relations, namely semantic and pragmatic, have 
been mixed together and “grammaticalised” in these lan guages» (Bhat 1991, 2). As 
a consequence, there is no meaningful way to define subject in those languages 
where agent and topic are explicitly coded with two separate coding procedures. 
Thus, there is actually no need for postulating an independent subject in either 
Japanese or Kannada.8 In Japanese, topic and agent are distinguished morphologi-
cally (by two different “particles”, respectively wa and ga); in Kannada – on which 
Bhat focused his analysis – the topical constituent is marked syntactically by the 
sentence-initial position, while the agent is marked by the nominative case (regard-
less its position in the sentence).
7. Some linguists prefer coding properties (see Mel’čuk 2014; Croft 1994), but usually behaviour-
al syntactic properties are believed to be the most relevant in this respect.
8. While Bhat (1991, 88) considers Kannada a language without subject, others do not share the 
same opinion; thus, Dryer (1982), whose understanding of subjecthood is, however, quite different 
from the one suggested by Bhat, considers subject a necessary category in Kannada, at least in some 
contexts.
FS_1.indd   111 31/01/2018   21:32:27
112 Artemij Keidan
In the present paper I will base my analysis on a few properties usually attrib-
uted to the subject that so far have not been taken into consideration in the debate 
on subjecthood in Pāṇini’s grammar. They are the following.
- Obligatoriness: if a language has one or more obligatory arguments, subject will 
be among them.
- Semantic unrestrictedness: subjects tend to be role-unbound, rather than being 
restricted to one specific semantic role (as happens with other grammatical rela-
tions). Subjects not only express the agent, but very likely subsume also other roles, 
such as the experiencer, the possessor, etc.
- Centrality in transformations: if a language has voices (such as active, passive etc.) 
or valency derivation phenomena (such as causative, decausative, etc.), the highest 
position to which lower arguments can be raised, for the purposes of topicaliza-
tion, is that of subject.
The following discussion aims at demonstrating that all these features are some-
how taken into consideration, even if not mentioned directly, in Pāṇini’s grammat-
ical tradition.
3. What Language?
Rather than an “eternal” Sanskrit (as believed by the late Indian grammatical tradi-
tion, see Houben 1996), the Sanskrit language depicted in the Aṣṭādhyāyī must be 
considered a somewhat artificial medium used by a community of learned speak-
ers. Already around Pāṇini’s time (possibly from 600 BC onwards, see Kulikov 
2013, 65), and more so at the time of Pāṇini’s most authoritative commentators 
Kātyāyana and Patañjali, Sanskrit was replaced by some Middle Indo-Aryan ver-
naculars in the oral usage. That it was a dead language, i.e. the L1 of no speaker, 
is proven by the fact that it was taught in a grammar. It is hardly conceivable that 
in an ancient society an entire tradition of grammatical studies could have arisen 
just for the sake of pure science and the pursuit of truth (even if, centuries later, it 
could have become such a speculative discipline), see Houben (2001, 32). On the 
contrary, we know several examples of indigenous grammatical traditions (e.g. the 
Arabic or the Icelandic ones), that arose precisely in order to preserve a dying or a 
dead language from oblivion.
Many scholars have called attention to the fact that, when speaking about 
Pāṇini’s grammar, there are not one but two languages which need to be ana-
lysed: the object-language of the grammar (i.e., Sanskrit) and the meta-language 
of the grammatical description (a set of highly conventional and almost algebraic 
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markers, highly dissimilar from the “natural” Sanskrit). But we should also con-
sider a third language here, namely the native language of the primary audience of 
the grammar or, in Houben’s (2001, 35) terms, its public. Indeed, for a long time 
after its exit from oral usage, Sanskrit was still actively used in ritual practice, so 
the knowledge of grammar served primarily to adapt the rituals to the contextual 
needs of a worshipper. This learned usage was clearly subject to the influence of the 
mother-tongue of the imperfect speakers, not all of whom were well-versed in clas-
sical grammar. The influence of the spoken vernaculars must have kept growing 
as time passed, thus causing Sanskrit to go through an apparent, i.e. not a natural, 
linguistic evolution.9
This influence is of utmost relevance for the study of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, since the 
description of a language is always targeted at speakers of some language, either 
the same one as the described language, or a different one. In other words, any 
descriptive grammar is also necessarily a contrastive one, to some degree.10 Before 
the pāṇinīya grammatical tradition became a purely speculative science in its own 
right, it must have been used for explaining Sanskrit to speakers who did not speak 
this language as their mother tongue. Therefore, every statement of the Aṣṭādhyāyī 
should be viewed not from an absolute point of view, but as a contrastive stance: it 
explained the difference between Sanskrit and some other language, be it a form of 
Middle Indo-Aryan or even a non-Aryan vernacular.
We do not know much about this audience language and can only formulate 
some conjectures. However, this hypothetical language can become an attractive 
explanation for all those cases where Pāṇini’s description of Sanskrit looks par-
ticularly odd and unnatural, from the point of view of a classical Indo-European 
language. At least some of these oddities can therefore be interpreted as calques 
into Sanskrit grammar from some unascertained substrate vernacular. One such fa-
mous case is the description of the interface between semantic roles and argument 
case marking, as explained further, Section 5.1.
9. This process eventually led to the formation of “mixed” languages, such as Buddhist Hybrid 
Sanskrit. But already the innovations introduced by Patañjali with respect to what was taught in the 
Aṣṭādhyāyī appear as a drift towards Prakritisation of the classical language. This is the impression 
one gets while reading such surveys as Laddu (1974).
10. Think of two grammars of Chinese, one for English speakers and the other for speakers of 
Vietnamese. The English grammar will explain the Chinese tonal system from scratch, describing 
it phonetically and functionally. The Vietnamese one will simply explain how Chinese tones differ 
from the Vietnamese tones.
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4. What Grammar?
In accordance with the idea that I have defended previously in Keidan (2015), 
and with similar proposals by Joshi‒Roodbergen (1983), I reject the view of the 
Aṣṭādhyāyī as a monolithic system authored by one brilliant grammarian. While 
the evolution of the grammar from Pāṇini to his earliest commentators has been 
largely recognised by Pāṇinian scholars (see e.g. Deshpande 1980), a theoretical 
stratification must be recognised, in my opinion, also within the Aṣṭādhyāyī it-
self. Thus, some apparent theoretical inconsistencies observable in the way syntax 
is treated in the Aṣṭādhyāyī cannot be resolved by simply adding some Pāṇinian 
trickery – as traditionalist scholars would do, cf. Cardona (1976a, 158) – but are to 
be seen as evidence for the compositional history of the grammar (see the discus-
sion in Keidan 2015). Aṣṭādhyāyī could therefore be considered a text with multiple 
authorship that has just been collected, but not completely authored, by someone 
conventionally identified with the great grammarian Pāṇini. 
As we go outside the text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, the grammatical theory could have 
evolved even further. Apparently, the pāṇinīya scholastics maintains all the termi-
nology and methodology used by Pāṇini, but sometimes the resemblance is only 
superficial. The grammatical meaning that is attributed to Pāṇini’s terminology 
can quite differ from the original theory. Sometimes new meanings and interpreta-
tions are explicitly stated by the commentators. At other times commentators only 
provide indirect insights into the possible grammatical debate of that time through 
the linguistic examples they use in the discussion. Many of the examples are not 
quoted as a confirmation of a theory, but as a challenge to it; i.e. not as answers, 
but as questions for the grammarian. Pāṇini’s grammar was already a “frozen”, un-
amendable, sacred text at that time. Therefore, the only way to present linguistic 
novelties was to submit unpāṇinian sentences to the discussion. The reason for this 
was the evolution of the audience’s language: the linguistic feeling of the speakers 
forced them to search for explanations in Pāṇini’s theory of some linguistic phe-
nomena that Pāṇini’s Sanskrit simply did not possess. Consequently, the grammar 
in the whole became more and more contrastive as time passed.
The language of the grammatical examples has often been criticised by contem-
porary scholars for being “unnatural” Sanskrit, unattested in any classical text, see 
Bhate (1996). This might also be justified in relation to the latest historical stages of 
the grammar. But, at least as far as the oldest commentaries are concerned, i.e. the 
vārttikas ‘glosses’ of Kātyāyana and Patañjali’s bhāṣyas ‘comments’, it is more in-
formative, and also challenging for the scholars, to consider the apparently unnat-
ural Sanskrit sentences quoted by the grammarians as calques from their – or their 
public’s – native language, and not a weird and artificial “grammarians’ Sanskrit”, 
as Bhate and others term it (as already pointed out by Kulikov 2013).
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5. Subject and kartr̥
5.1 Kartr̥ as the Best Candidate for Subject
Pāṇini’s category of kartr̥  has always attracted the scholars’ attention as the likeliest 
candidate to become the equivalent of our notion of subject. For space reasons, 
here I only give a brief overview of how Pāṇini’s syntax-semantics interface works.11 
On the semantics side, he distinguishes six categories, named kārakas, which are 
quite similar to our semantic roles. On the syntactic side, he surveys all the nomi-
nal case categories, named vibhaktis, and assigns a few different functions to each 
of them, among which there is also that of coding the kāraka roles. The latter can 
be expressed also by other morphological means, such as derivative suffixes and, 
surprisingly, verbal endings (personal agreement markers). Moreover, the nominal 
coding of kārakas comes as the last option, after it is ascertained that the other pos-
sibilities have not been used (therefore, only one expression per kāraka is admit-
ted). It is also to be noted that the nominative case is not assigned to any kāraka. 
The kāraka role that resembles our semantic role of agent is called kartr̥ . Its canon-
ical realisation through vibhakti is tr̥ tīyā ‘third case’, i.e. the instrumental (rather 
than the nominative, as we would expect); optionally it can also be expressed by the 
genitive. Alternatively, kartr̥  is expressed by the active verbal endings or by some 
agentive suffixes. See the following analysis of a couple of typical Sanskrit sentenc-
es; grammatical glosses are provided, with the indication of the kāraka roles “ex-
pressed” by each word, if any.12 Besides kartr̥ , karman is also mentioned, which cor-
responds to the undergoer or patient semantic (macro)role in the modern system.
2)
a. pacaty   odanaṃ   Devadattaḥ
 (kartr̥ )   (karman)
 cook:3SG.ACT  rice:ACC  Devadatta:NOM
 ‘Devadatta is cooking rice’
11. A few detailed descriptions of this system exist. A classical introduction to Pāṇini’s syntax is, 
e.g., Cardona (1974), which follows the Indian traditionalist approach. A modernised linguistic anal-
ysis of the same theory is provided in Kiparsky (2002). For a critical review of some interesting aspects 
of this system see also Keidan (2007).
12. Note that this is meant in the Indian sense of “expressing”: either the nominal case termina-
tion or the verbal endings can express the kārakas. This explains the unusual placement of the kāraka 
labels in examples (2) to (4).
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b. odanaḥ   pacyate   Devadattena
    (karman)  (kartr̥ )
 rice:NOM  cook:PASS:3SG.MID Devadatta:INSTR
 ‘Rice is being cooked by Devadatta’
Clearly, the karaka/vibhakti device accounts very well for both active and passive 
sentences. As we can see from the functional labelling, while the semantic roles 
remain unchanged, their morphological encoding changes. Three descriptive odd-
ities can be highlighted here. 1) Only single exponence is admitted: Pāṇini «[…] 
adopts the one-to-one correspondence between morphological elements and 
morphosyntactic features» (Kiparsky 2002, 45), i.e. there appears to be no idea 
of anaphora or agreement; 2) one of the morphological means of expressing the 
arguments’ semantic roles is the verbal endings, which is quite unusual – not to 
say inconsistent – with how we normally describe the morphology of the ancient 
Indo-European languages; 3) no precedence is reserved for the active voice over the 
passive: both are just two equiprobable distributions of kartr̥  and karman with-
in sentence morphology, not “derived” from each other in any way, see Cardona 
(1974, 286, n. 36). These descriptive devices of Pāṇini’s appear too strange not to 
be seen as a possible adaptation of Sanskrit grammar to the linguistic habits of 
speakers speaking some completely different language, therefore an instance of the 
difference between object language and the native language of the grammar’s audi-
ence. The exact nature of this audience language is hard to ascertain. However, as 
a hypothesis, we can imagine a language with poor morphology, verbal coding of 
arguments, and a different type of alignment as opposed to the nominative-accusa-
tive alignment seen in Sanskrit. 
The main reason for treating the kartr̥  role as the most likely Pāṇinian equiv-
alent of our subject is the fact that it closely translates our semantic role of agent, 
which, in its turn, usually corresponds to the subject. However, the equipollency 
of subject and kartr̥  has so far generally been rejected by scholars, even though 
they could have had very different ideas of subject in mind. Let us review the main 
reasons for this rejection. 
First of all, some scholars supported a poorly substantiated view according 
to which Pāṇini’s kartr̥  is equivalent to the nominative and, consequently, corre-
sponds to the modern subject. This is apparently inferable from Renou’s diction-
ary: «Le [kartr̥ ] est noté en principe par le nominatif comme il résulte indirecte-
ment de iii 1 68 joint à ii 3 1 […]» (Renou 1957, 121). Renou’s explanation is not 
genuinely Pāṇinian: the nominative does not express kartr̥ , nor any other kāraka 
(as explicitly stated in Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.3.46 prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamā-
tre prathamā ‘Nominative indicates the meaning of the nominal base, the gender 
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and the number only’).13 The ambiguity of the notion of subject caused even Joshi‒
Roodbergen (1975, IX), two of the most famous Pāṇini specialists, to make a sim-
ilar claim, equating it to Pāṇini’s prātipadikārtha ‘nominal stem meaning’ of the 
nominative.14 This wrong equation had already been rejected by Al-George (1958, 
45-46): «[…] le kartr̥  ne se réfère pas à un élément formel, tel que serait le mot au 
nominatif, qui puisse l’exprimer en exclusivité, mais à l’idée générale d’agent».
Next, Cardona (1974, 244) correctly rejects the applicability of the generativist 
notion of “external argument” to Pāṇini’s theory, since Sanskrit «[…] has no abso-
lutely required word order which would render useful the adoption of a grammat-
ical subject associated with some positioning». He is also right in criticizing (Car-
dona 1974, 287, n. 41) the generative-inspired but unsubstantiated interpretation 
of kartr̥  as subject by Kiparsky‒Staal (1969, 36-97).
On the functionalist side, some scholars have tested Sanskrit syntax, togeth-
er with Pāṇini’s description thereof, for subjecthood, with a special regard to the 
behavioural features. Sanskrit clearly does not tie many of Keenan’s features to 
any precise argument, particularly not to the nominative-marked one, as proven 
in Hook (1980; 1991) and mentioned already in Speijer (1886, 200). What really 
triggers such phenomena as many kinds of deletions (e.g. with the infinitives), or 
reflexivization, is the semantic role of agent, rather than subject.
5.2 Subject and kartr̥ Reconsidered
However, there are some other features of subjecthood that could be envisaged 
in Pāṇini’s grammatical tradition but have escaped scholars’ attention so far. If 
we take them into consideration, we arrive at the conclusion that, at least in the 
post-Pāṇinian period of the pāṇinīya school, the term kartr̥  drifted more and more 
from the semantic to the syntactic domain.
I. The logic of the kāraka/vibhakti device entails the obligatoriness of the kartr̥ . 
It can be expressed either by the verbal termination or by the nominal case, so in 
practice it cannot remain unexpressed. Pāṇini does not state this anywhere and 
probably did not mean it to be understood that way, but Pāṇini’s commentators 
and later grammarians, particularly Bhartr̥hari (5th c. AD), made much effort to 
13. Renou is probably referring to an ancient idea that the nominative case ending is to be some-
how considered samānādhikaraṇa ‘co-referent’ with the verbal ending expressing the agent. This 
idea was suggested as a solution to what already appeared paradoxical to the oldest commentators of 
Pāṇini, i.e. that the nominative could be the expression of no semantic role, see Cardona (1974, 249).
14. At a purely terminological level similar confusion is found in many other authors who use 
the term subject as simply an equivalent of agent, see for example Subrahmanyam (1975).
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distinguish a kartr̥  in every type of sentence as if, in their mind, it was necessarily 
required. Such a goal is easily achieved if we remember that verbal endings are said 
to express the kartr̥ , and that a finite verb is present in almost all sentences.15 We 
know that, if in a language there is one argument that is necessarily present in every 
sentence, it must be the subject. Therefore, this attitude of Pāṇini’s commentators 
reveals a subject-oriented language feeling, probably modelled on the native lan-
guage of the grammarians or of their audience.
II. In many – even if not in all – languages that have subject, it is characterised 
by a high degree of semantic eclecticism (see Mel’čuk 2014, 210). It usually corre-
sponds to the agent, but will very likely also include the experiencer, the possessor, 
and some other semantic roles; plus, in the passive voice, it will be the patient. 
Therefore, the subject is, among all the grammatical relations, the one that is least 
bound to a specific semantic role, unlike others which are more selective (e.g., the 
indirect object is usually a recipient, etc.). Now, if we consider the evolution of the 
idea of kartr̥  within the Aṣṭādhyāyī and after, we easily observe a clear drift from 
semanticism to an increasingly syntactic approach to the definition of the kartr̥  
role (as well as of the other kārakas). Pāṇini departs from pre-existing terms which 
were invented in order to be understood “etymologically”, without further expla-
nation or a formal definition. For instance, the word kartr̥  means ‘doer’ in Sanskrit; 
similarly, the word karman means ‘what is done’ or a ‘deed’, etc. Pāṇini introduced 
formal definitions, making a first step from naïve linguistics to a more sophisti-
cated theory.16 In the case of kartr̥ , Pāṇini’s new formal definition is particularly 
abstract and distant from the etymological meaning of the term. He defines it as 
svatantra ‘independent’, literally ‘self-bound, self-depending’. The true sense of 
such a qualification was debated within Pāṇini’s school. Probably, the intended 
meaning was that the kartr̥  is the only kāraka whose definition does not refer to 
any other kāraka.17 In any case, the term svatantra ‘independent’ resembles the 
15. The only apparent exception would be the agentless sentences with stative or “middle” verbs, 
such as śete ‘[s/he] lies down’. Usually the middle termination expresses the karman ‘patient’, and 
no nominal expression of the kartr̥  can be envisaged here. However, Bhartr̥hari solves this issue by 
claiming that the middle verbal endings express kartr̥  in such sentences, too; see Cardona (1974, 285, 
n. 27). Similar cases are already dealt with in Pāṇini’s own rule 3.1.87 on the so-called karmavat kartr̥  
‘patient-like agent’.
16. In Keidan (2015) further evolutionary steps are suggested and discussed: (i) the system where 
vibhaktis ‘case categories’ are more pivotal than kārakas; (ii) the system without kārakas but retaining 
the vibhaktis; and (iii) the stage where neither kārakas nor vibhaktis appear to be taken into account.
17. All the other kāraka definitions either explicitly refer to the kartr̥  or reference is made to it by 
the commentaries. For example, the definition of karman ‘patient’ is kartur īpsitatamam ‘the most 
desired by the kartr̥ ’. Another possible interpretation puts the rule defining the kartr̥  in comparison 
with the next one, where hetu ‘causative agent’ is introduced, on which the main agent is, in some 
way, “dependent”, see Freschi‒Pontillo (2014, 47).
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modern phrase “privileged argument”: subject is the only argument capable of be-
ing qualified as independent, whatever idea of “independence” we may have.18 The 
defense of kartr̥ ’s independence is made explicitly by Bhartr̥hari, who lists a few 
qualities that characterise it, see Cardona’s (1974, 239) summary. But this definition 
in particular is highly abstract, i.e. detached from the semantics of concrete verbs, 
which fits quite well with our understanding of subjecthood. Sanskrit certainly 
lacked a strong notion of subjecthood, but the grammarians’ mother tongue possi-
bly did have one. So, again, this definition could have been an attempt to reconcile 
the official grammar with the linguistic feeling of the audience.
III. The last, and most important, feature to mention is the fact that kartr̥  is 
the target of a set of transformations corresponding to what modern linguistics 
calls actancy derivation and voice. These phenomena are not mentioned directly 
by Pāṇini and are only known from the commentators, starting from Patañjali, 
who introduce them as a problem: there are some sentences that are perceived as a 
challenge for Pāṇini’s definition of the kartr̥ , and then a solution is suggested. Let 
us start from analyzing the sentences in question:
3)
a. asinā   chinatti   devadattaḥ
 (karaṇa)  (kartr̥ )
 axe:INSTR   cut:3SG.ACT  Devadatta:NOM
 ‘Devadatta cuts [whatever objec] with an axe’
b. asiś   chinatti
    (kartr̥ )
 axe:NOM  cut:3SG.ACT
 ‘The axe cuts [by itself]’
4)
a. devadattaḥ  sthālyāṃ  pacati
    (adhikaraṇa)  (kartr̥ )
 Devadatta:NOM pot:LOC  cook:3SG.ACT
 ‘Devadatta is cooking in a pot’
18. Interestingly, medieval European philosophers and grammarians also mentioned a very sim-
ilar phrase per se stans ‘standing on its own’ while defining such notions as subject, substantive and 
the like, see Alfieri (2014). It almost literally translates Sanskrit svatantra.
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b. sthālī  pacati
   (kartr̥ )
 pot:NOM cook:3SG.ACT
 ‘The pot cooks’
In example (3) the two sentences mean, respectively, ‘Devadatta is cutting stuff 
with an axe’ and ‘The axe cuts by itself’. In today’s terminology we would say that 
the relation between the two sentences is that of an agent-deleting actancy deriva-
tion, while the instrument (called karaṇa by Pāṇini) is promoted to the position 
of subject.19 In example (4) a similar transformation involves the locus (called adhi-
karaṇa by Pāṇini) which is being promoted to the subject position: ‘Devadatta is 
cooking in a pot’ vs. ‘The pot cooks’. As Patañjali explains, the difference between 
the two members of this transformation is in the so-called vivakṣā ‘communicative 
intention’. The vivakṣā is used increasingly by Pāṇini’s commentators whenever 
the text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī is indeterminate or vague with reference to some gram-
matical rule, see van Nooten (1983), Radicchi (1993). Thus, first of all, the vivakṣā is 
invoked as the guiding principle for the speaker to decide between the verbal and 
the nominal expression of the kartr̥ : Pāṇini just mentions these two possibilities, 
without saying which has precedence. In fact, according to Patañjali, it is the speak-
er’s communicative intention that makes him/her choose between the active and 
the passive voice. Therefore, in modern terms, we would locate it in the domain 
of information structure. Vivakṣā looks like a way to denote topicality: while the 
former is the intention to speak, the latter is defined as ‘what is spoken about’.20 
Indeed, the choice of the verbal voice is the choice of what element is topicalised, 
the agent (as in the active voice), or the patient (as in the passive voice). Either the 
former or the latter, accordingly, becomes the subject of the sentence.
The sentences quoted in (3) and (4) are also explained by the commentators 
through the vivakṣā. They present a tricky theory where multiple actions build up 
to the main action denoted by the verb. Each argument of the verb, we are told, 
can be the kartr̥  of a “sub-action”: the axe, originally the instrument of cutting, 
can become the kartr̥  of a derived sentence (ex. 3b); similarly, the pot, normally 
the locus of the main action of cooking, can become the kartr̥  of the derived sen-
tence (ex. 4b). Note that this view presupposes the assignment of the kāraka roles 
19. Note that, since the verb does not change its morphological form, the actancy derivation is 
only visible from the semantics of the arguments, and is therefore of the “labile” type, see Keidan 
(2014).
20. This is not the interpretation that vivakṣā is usually given by traditionalist scholars. Thus, 
Cardona (1974, 52, n. 14) seems to be diminishing its significance: «Pāṇinīyas speak of vivakṣā (‘desire 
to speak, say’); when they do this they are of course simply saying that the grammar accounts for what 
people say».
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to the arguments themselves, while verbal endings are said to just “express” them 
“co-referentially”; this idea was introduced by Bhartr̥hari and represents another 
step away from Pāṇinian orthodoxy. 
The kartr̥  of a derived sentence is, from our point of view, also its topic. In-
deed, actancy derivation serves the goal of topicalization similarly to verbal voice. 
And, according to Pāṇini’s commentators, here the vivakṣā principle intervenes in 
order to allow the speaker to choose among different kartr̥ s. Chronologically, this 
mechanism is described in later strata of the commentaries than the choice between 
passive and active, so that some scholars speak about vivakṣā₂ here as opposed to vi-
vakṣā₁ in the preceding context (see Deshpande 1990). But in any case, both etymo-
logically (because communicative intention amounts to the selection of a discourse 
topic) and functionally (because it produces sentences where different semantic 
arguments are raised to the subject position) the term vivakṣā closely recalls the 
notion of topicalization, which is relevant in the present context since it is among 
those features that better define subjecthood. Indeed, if we remember that subject 
can be synthesised as a coalescence of topic and agent, the Indian notion of kartr̥  in 
its late, post-Pāṇinian interpretation appears very close to this definition.
6. Conclusion
From the discussion above we can conclude that the statement in (1) should be 
reformulated. The loose definition of subject that was taken into consideration 
earlier should be substituted with an explicit multifactor functionalist approach. 
Rather than considering the literal wording of Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī I have dealt 
with linguistic examples provided by the pāṇinīya tradition, since they reveal more 
grammatical complexity than was admitted by Pāṇini. And, finally, instead of con-
sidering only Classical Sanskrit, I propose to consider the native language of those 
speakers who were the primary audience of the grammar and for whom the gram-
mar was intended as a source of subjecthood. The statement now runs as follows:
5)
There are more subjecthood features in the Old Indian grammatical tradi-
tion than we used to think, provided that the discussions by Pāṇini’s com-
mentators of some Sanskrit sentences hypothetically calqued from their 
mother tongue are taken as our evidence.
With this proviso we can conclude that, contrary to common opinion, the kartr̥  
role of the Indian grammar, at least in its late interpretation, can be considered a 
good equivalent of the European notion of subject for a good number of reasons, 
the main one being its relatedness to the notion of topicality.
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